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Abstract.
Using a political-frame-free, lab-in-the-field experiment, we investigate the associations between
employment status, self-reported political ideology, and preferences for redistribution. The
experiment consists of a real-effort task, followed by a four-player dictator game. In one
treatment, dictator game initial endowments depend on participants’ performance in the real-
effort task, i.e., they are earned, in the other, they are randomly determined. We find that being
employed or unemployed is associated with revealed redistributive preferences, while the
political ideology of the employed and unemployed is not. In contrast, the revealed redistributive
preferences of students are strongly associated with their political ideologies. The employed and
right-leaning students redistribute earnings less than windfalls, the unemployed and left-leaning
students make no such distinction.
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2Preferences for the redistribution of earned income have received considerable attention across
the social sciences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Margalit, 2013; Owens and Pedulla, 2014).
Survey-based studies identify material self-interest (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) and
ideological factors, most notably political left-right ideology (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Fong,
2001), as the principle determinants of such preferences. In most of these studies, redistributive
preferences are quantified using politically-framed survey questions invoking specific
redistributive schemes or welfare policies. This being the case, if individuals’ redistributive
preferences vary depending on which policy they have in mind, these frames could be driving the
results (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Jaime-Castillo and Sáez-Lozano, 2016).2
To eliminate the possible effects of political framing, some studies use behavioral laboratory
experiments designed to reveal individuals’ redistributive preferences through the decisions that
they make under abstract and controlled conditions (Barber et al., 2013; Barr et al., 2015; Barr et
al., 2016; Durante et al., 2014; Esarey, 2011). These consistently show that economic status
affects redistributive preferences, while the association between political ideology and
redistributive preferences appears to be more nuanced. Durante et al. (2014) show that, among
students, self-identified political liberalism is positively associated with demand for
redistribution. However, Esarey et al. (2011) find strong support for the self-interest hypothesis,
but only an indirect effect of ideology, specifically, conservatives are more responsive to their
self-interests than liberals. And Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2015) find that attitudes towards
redistribution are driven by subjective, relative economic status with ideological principles being
used to justify attitudes ex post.
2 Framing might also be an issue in field studies focusing on a particular redistributive policy (Hårsman and
Quigley, 2010).
3We complement this literature, by using a “lab-in-the-field” experiment (Morton and Williams,
2010) to investigate the associations between economic status, political ideology and preferences
for the redistribution of earned income. The experiment involves a distributive justice game
designed to measure individual acknowledgement of earned entitlement, i.e., the strength of the
preference not to redistribute money that is earned compared to money gained owing to pure
luck, and participants’ political left-right ideology is measured using a standard survey question.
To identify the effect of economic status on redistributive preferences, employed and
unemployed individuals were invited to participate in the experiment. In this regard, we follow
recent longitudinal and experimental studies that show that experiencing unemployment is
associated with increased demand for welfare policy (Margalit, 2013), redistribution (Owens and
Pedulla, 2014), and the public provision of unemployment benefits (Naumann et al., 2016), and a
reduced inclination to reward effort and productivity (Barr et al., 2015; Barr et al., 2016). Then,
to build a link to the literature on laboratory-based behavioral experiments, we also invited
students to participate.
Drawing on the extant attitudinal and behavioral literature on unemployment and redistribution
and using the psychological concepts of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and self-serving
bias (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997), Barr and coauthors (Barr et al., 2015; Barr et al., 2016)
develop a theoretical framework describing the effect of economic status on redistributive
preferences. Within this framework, the unemployed gravitate towards egalitarian principles of
justice to reduce the dissonance otherwise caused by sticking to meritocratic ideals, while
necessarily receiving resources to which they do not feel entitled. In contrast, the employed
gravitate towards meritocratic ideals to reduce the dissonance otherwise caused by sticking to
egalitarian principles, while not fully redistributing their own earnings in the pursuit of equity.
4When applied to our experiment, this framework predicts that the employed acknowledge earned
entitlement and the unemployed do not, with political ideology playing no role.3 For students,
cognitive dissonance is less of a concern. They can receive resources despite not working and
maintain meritocratic ideals without suffering cognitive dissonance because they are investing in
their own future earning capacity. For this reason, Barr et al. (2015) hypothesized that, students,
like the employed, acknowledge earned entitlement. However, note that students could,
alternatively, choose not to redistribute their own resources to others and maintain egalitarian
principles without suffering cognitive dissonance because they have little to redistribute and are
investing in their future capacity to contribute to society. In summary, in contrast to those of the
employed and the unemployed, students’ redistributive preferences can be aligned with their
political ideologies without a psychological cost being incurred.
Note that this framework explains the regularities observed in survey data, while being distinct
from the material self-interest hypothesis. Specifically, this framework posits that individuals,
rather than acting directly in accordance with their own material self-interest, apply the
principles of distributive justice that best serve their self-interests in everyday life.
METHODS
The experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, participants were asked to engage in a
real-effort task, an easy-to-understand, manual task for which no skills were required. In the
second part, participants engaged in a four-player dictator game (4PDG). A tray divided into four
quadrants, with each quadrant corresponding to one of the four players, was handed to each
3 Although, consistent with the findings of Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2015), a political ideology could be used as a
post-hoc justification of the self-serving, dissonance-reducing redistributive preferences.
5participant. Each participant knew which of the quadrants on the tray corresponded to him- or
herself. The initial endowments of each of the four were indicated by black counters placed in
each quadrant (1 counter = 1€). The four initial endowment values were 6€, 10€, 12€ and 16€.
Participants were then told they could redistribute the counters however they wanted. Once
everyone had finished, the final allocations proposed by one of the four, randomly selected, were
used to determine the final payoffs for all four players. Three or four groups of four participated
in each experimental session. The participants did not know who they were playing with and
their redistribution decisions were made in private and kept anonymous.4
There were two treatments. In the earned treatment, participants’ initial endowments in the
4PDG were directly related to their within-session rankings in the real-effort task – participants
who were more productive started the 4PDG with higher initial endowments – and participants
knew this. In the random treatment, the initial endowments were randomly assigned and, again,
participants knew this.
Following the experiment, participants completed a survey which included questions on
employment status, political left-right placement (LERI), and other characteristics. The LERI
question invited them to place themselves on a ten-point scale. It was worded as follows: “When
people talk about politics, the terms left and right are usually used. Below there is a left-right
axis. Where would you place yourself on this axis? Indicate it with an X”.5
4 The experimental design is fully described and the experimental instructions presented in the Supplementary
Materials.
5 In Europe, this is the most commonly used method to elicit political ideology in surveys like the Eurobarometer,
European Election Studies, European Social Survey, World Value Survey and most national election studies
(Weber, 2011). Empirical evidence in Western Europe suggests that the left-right placement serves as a heuristic
6We ran 29 experimental sessions involving 161 employed people, 137 unemployed people, and
114 students from across two Spanish cities, Bilbao and Cordoba. The sub-samples were
balanced across genders and cities with the students being marginally but not significantly
younger and less educated (in terms of years completed). The average participant was 27 years
old and had post-secondary education. Ideology was slightly skewed to the left, with a mean
value of four.6 Each experimental session involved a mix of employed, unemployed and
students.
To investigate the effects of economic status and LERI on redistributive preferences, we start by
estimating an extension of Barr et al.’s (2015) model:
ݔ௜௝ஷ௜=ܽ ଴ +ܽ ଵܧ௜+ ଶܽݕ௝+ ଷܽ൫ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ସܷܽ௜+ ହܽ(ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜) + ଺ܽ൫ܷ ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ଻ܽ൫ܷ ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+଼ܽ ܮܧܴܫ௜+ ଽܽ(ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜) + ଵܽ଴൫ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ଵܽଵ൫ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ߝ௜௝ (1)
where, as in Barr et al. (2015), ݔ௜௝ is participant i’s allocation to participant j in the 4PDG
expressed as a proportion of the maximum amount that i could allocate to j (€44), ܧ௜ takes the
value 1 if ݅played under the earned treatment and 0 if ݅played under the random treatment, ݕ௝ is
j’s initial endowment, ܷ௜ takes the value 1 if player ݅ is unemployed and zero if they are
employed or a student and, in the extension of the model, ܮܧܴܫ௜ ranges from 1 (extreme left) to
10 (extreme right), ଴ܽ to ଵܽଵ are the coefficients to be estimated, and ߝ௜௝ is the error term.7 This
used by individuals to cope with political complexities, particularly those related to three components of political
ideology: social identities (e.g. social class), policy attitudes and party identification (Freire, 2008).
6 The sample is fully described in Table A.1 of the Supplementary Materials.
7 We extend the model to include ܮܧܴܫ௜ following Barr et al.’s (2015) method for including controls in their
analysis.
7model identifies the slope of the relationship between j’s initial endowment, ݕ௝, and i’s final
allocation to j, ݔ௜௝, and the effects of whether j earned her initial endowment and i’s economic
status and political ideology on that slope. In this model, acknowledgement of earned entitlement
(AEE) manifests as the slope being more positive in the earned compared to the random
treatment. The coefficient ଻ܽ identifies the effect of i’s economic status on the difference in the
slope between the treatments, i.e., the effect of economic status on AEE. If, as Barr et al. (2015)
predicted and found in the UK, the unemployed do not acknowledge earned entitlement, while
the employed and students do, ଻ܽ will be negative. The coefficient ଵܽଵ identifies the effect of i’s
political ideology on the difference in the slope between the treatments, i.e., the effect of political
ideology on AEE. If AEE is strong among people on the political right and absent among people
on the political left, ଵܽଵ will be positive.8
The estimation of Model (1) is informative about whether, for the full sample of participants,
being unemployed and/or political ideology explain variations in AEE. However, it is not
informative about whether and how the relationship between political ideology and AEE varies
depending on economic status. To investigate this, we estimate Model (1) excluding the ܷ௜
indicator and all interactions involving the ܷ௜ indicator separately for the employed, unemployed
and student participants.9
Following Barr et al. (2015), the zero allocations to others made by participants who took all the
counters for themselves (41 participants did this) and all participants’ allocations to themselves
8 For a complete description of the model and its interpretation see section 3 in the Supplementary Materials.
9 An alternative approach would be to include one additional variable (identifying either the employed or the
students) and 21 additional interaction terms in the model. This would yield similar and a few extra insights, but
interpretation would become very onerous.
8are excluded from the analysis.10 Finally, the allocations to others made by seven additional
participants are excluded from the analysis because they did not answer the LERI question in the
survey. This leaves three observations for each of 364 participants (144 employed, 121
unemployed and 99 students), 1,092 observations in total. The estimations are conducted using
ordinary least squares and then the standard errors are adjusted parametrically to account for
clustering within decision-making participants, i.e., within is.11
RESULTS
Column (1) of Table 1 presents the OLS estimation of model (1) for the full sample. In this
estimation, the coefficient on ܷ௜ is insignificantly different from zero. However, the coefficients
on the three interaction terms involving ܷ௜ are each significant at the 5% level (or better).12 The
significance of these coefficients indicates that economic status is associated with AEE. The
significant positive coefficient on ݕ௝ interacted with ܧ௜ indicates that the employed and students
acknowledge earned entitlement and the significant negative coefficient on ݕ௝ interacted with ܧ௜
and ܷ௜ indicates that the unemployed acknowledge earned entitlement considerably less. Further,
10 Models 1 and 2 in Table A.2 of the Supplementary Materials indicate that there is no association between, acting
selfishly, i.e., taking all the counters for oneself, and either political ideology or employment status.
11 In Table A.3 of the Supplementary Materials, instead of the parametrically adjusted standard errors, we present
standard errors estimated non-parametrically using a wild bootstrap to account for clustering (Cameron et al. 2008).
This table indicates that our findings are unchanged regardless of the method used to account for clustering and of
whether we account for clustering within decision-maker or within experimental session.
12 If we include an indicator variable for students and its interactions withܧ௜, ݕ௝ and ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ in the model, the newly
added variables are both individually and jointly insignificant. This indicates that being employed and being a
student have statistically indistinguishable effects on allocative decision-making. If we exclude the allocation
decisions made by students from the estimation of Model (1), the results are almost identical.
9a linear restriction test indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that AEE is zero among
the unemployed. In contrast, the coefficients on ܮܧܴܫ௜and the three interaction terms involving
ܮܧܴܫ௜ are jointly and all individually insignificant; this estimation provides no support of the
hypothesis that AEE is associated with political ideology.
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 1 present the estimations of Model 1, excluding the ܷ௜ indicator and
all interactions involving the ܷ௜ indicator, for the employed, unemployed and students separately
and Figure 1 contains a set of corresponding graphs. The graph in each panel is derived from one
of the estimations and plots the effect of a one unit increase in j’s initial endowment on i’s
allocation to j, Δݔ௜௝ Δݕ௝⁄ , against i’s ܮܧܴܫ௜ placement. The effects under the earned and random
treatments are graphed separately. The graph in Panel A is derived from the estimation for the
employed, the graph in Panel B from the estimation for the unemployed and the graph in Panel C
from the estimation for the students.
In the estimation for the employed (column (2)), the coefficient on the interaction between j’s
initial endowment and ܧ௜ is positive, large and significant at the 10% level and the coefficients
on all the terms involving ܮܧܴܫ௜ including the interaction with ݕ௝ and ܧ௜, are small and
insignificant. Panel A, which is derived from this estimation, indicates that, among the
employed, when initial endowments are randomly assigned, j’s initial endowment has little or no
effect on i’s allocation to j and that this is the case for all values of ܮܧܴܫ௜. In contrast, when
initial endowments are earned, i’s allocation to j is positively affected by j’s initial endowment
and the magnitude of the effect is similar across all values of ܮܧܴܫ௜. Finally, among the
employed, AEE (the vertical distance between the lines) does not depend on ܮܧܴܫ௜. In summary,
across the political spectrum, employed people acknowledge earned entitlement.
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Table 1. Regression analysis of the effect of ideology and employment status on distributive
preferences (Dependent variable = i’s allocation to j
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Employed Unemployed Students
Earned treatment (ܧ௜) -0.075 ** -0.131 ** 0.038 -0.039
(0.033) (0.055) (0.047) (0.052)
j's initial endowment (ݕ௝) -0.073 -0.089 0.073 -0.052
(0.086) (0.155) (0.129) (0.080)
ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.218 * 0.414 * -0.087 -0.039
(0.121) (0.212) (0.173) (0.170)
ܷ௜ -0.024
(0.017)
ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜ 0.069 ***
(0.025)
ܷ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.127 **
(0.054)
ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ -0.236 ***
(0.086)
ܮܧܴܫ௜ -0.004 -0.012 0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜ -0.005 0.007 -0.017 -0.011
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.006
(0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.014)
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.035 -0.003 0.051 0.078 **
(0.026) (0.048) (0.042) (0.038)
Constant 0.231 *** 0.257 *** 0.176 *** 0.231 ***
(0.023) (0.040) (0.035) (0.027)
Observations 1092 432 363 297
Participants 364 144 121 99
Notes: Sample includes final allocations made to others by participants who made at least one positive final
allocation to another; there are three observations per participant; j's initial endowment (yj) = j's initial
endowment expressed as a proportion of the 44 tokens in the game; Earned (ܧ௜)=1 if i made allocations under the
earned treatment, =0 if i made allocations under the random treatment; standard errors clustered at the individual
level using the standard parametric approach; *** - sig. at 1%; ** - sig. at 5%, * - sig. at 10%
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In the estimation for the unemployed (column (3)) the coefficient on the interaction between j’s
initial endowment and ܧ௜is insignificant and the coefficients on all the terms involving ܮܧܴܫ௜are
also insignificant. Panel B, which is derived from this estimation, shows an increasing-to-the-
right vertical separation between the lines for the random and earned treatments, suggesting that
AEE is greater among unemployed people who are further to the political right. However, the
insignificance of the coefficient on the interaction between j’s initial endowment, ܧ௜ and ܮܧܴܫ௜
combined with a set of linear restrictions tests designed to test for AEE at each possible value of
ܮܧܴܫ௜ indicate that, across the political spectrum, unemployed people do not acknowledge
earned entitlement.13
Finally, in the estimation for students (column (4)), the coefficient on the interaction between j’s
initial endowment and ܧ௜ is insignificant, while the coefficient on the interaction between j’s
initial endowment, ܧ௜ and ܮܧܴܫ௜ is positive and significant at the 5% level. Panel C, which is
derived from this estimation, indicates that, among students, when initial endowments are
randomly assigned, j’s initial endowment has little or no effect on i’s allocation to j and that this
is the case for all values of ܮܧܴܫ௜. However, when initial endowments are earned, while j’s initial
endowment continues to have no effect on i’s allocation to j if i is located on the political left,
when i is located on the political right, i’s allocation to j is positively affected by j’s initial
endowment. A series of linear restriction tests indicate that the increasing-to-the-right vertical
separation between the two lines is significant at the 5% level or better when ܮܧܴܫ௜ is greater
than two. In summary, students on the far left do not acknowledge earned entitlement and, as we
move to the right, among students, AEE increases.14
13 When performing this and other sets of linear restriction tests relating to specific values of LERIi we use the
Benjamini-Hochberg’s (1995) false discovery rate procedure to correct for multiple comparisons.
14 The association between political ideology and AEE among students is robust to the inclusions of age and other
demographic characteristics in the analysis (see section 7 of the Supplementary Information).
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Figure 1. The effect of ideology on the acknowledgement of entitlement. The linear functions
graphed are derived from the regression models presented in columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 1.
DISCUSSION
This paper contributes to the growing literature on preferences for redistribution in two ways.
First, it provides an analysis of the associations between political left-right ideology, economic,
specifically employment, status and experimentally-elicited distributive preferences. This
analysis shows that, when making redistributive decisions in a political-frame-free context, the
employed acknowledge earned entitlement, the unemployed do not and, in both cases, political
ideology plays no or a very minor role. This is consistent with the findings of several prior
survey-based and the experimental studies of Esarey et al. (2011) and Brown-Iannuzzi et al.
(2015).
Second, the paper analyses the relationship between political ideology and redistributive
preferences, not only for the employed and unemployed, but also for students, thereby
13
encompassing various heretofore distinct strands in the literature. Here, the analysis reveals that,
in contrast to that of the employed and unemployed, students’ AEE is directly and strongly
related to their political ideology; those on the far left do not acknowledge earned entitlement
and those further to the right do. This is consistent with self-declared liberal students choosing a
higher tax rated, as reported by Durante et al. (2014).
Our findings are consistent with the idea that, when people are in full time education, they incur
no psychological cost from aligning their redistributive preferences with their political ideology.
However, when they enter the labor force, especially when they are working, such psychological
costs can loom large and their redistributive preferences and political ideology cease to be
associated as a consequence.
These findings need to be viewed with a degree of caution. For the employed, the absence of an
association between political ideology and AEE is clear and striking. However, for the
unemployed, while there is no statistical evidence of AEE anywhere on the political spectrum,
Panel C of Figure 1 suggests that movement towards the political right is associated with an
inclination towards AEE. Here, working with larger samples and including other covariates in
the analysis to account for heretofore unexplained heterogeneity could yield further insights.
For students, the well-defined relationship between self-proclaimed political ideology and the
redistributive decisions they make when given the opportunity is robust to the inclusions of age
and other demographic characteristics in the analysis.
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3. Regression models and their interpretation
4. Linear restriction tests
5. Accounting for potentially considerable changes in partial selfishness
6. Accounting for clustering non-parametrically
7. Inclusion of controls
8. Instructions and post-experimental questionnaire
21. Experimental Procedures
1.1. Real-Effort Task
In the real-effort task participants had to sort yellow and blue gravel into various containers for
seven minutes. There were two types of task. In the “filling task”, participants received a tray
on which there was a box containing mixed yellow and blue gravel and many small plastic
pots. They were asked to put seven pieces of yellow gravel and seven pieces of blue gravel in
each small pot. In the “emptying task”, they were given a tray on which there were two empty
boxes and many small plastic pots each containing a mixture of blue and yellow gravel. They
were asked to empty the small pots sorting the gravel by color, putting the blue gravel in one
of the boxes and the yellow gravel in the other. One or other task was undertaken in each
session. The emptying task can be viewed as preparation for the filling task and vice versa,
which enabled us to tell the participants in each session they were helping us prepare for
subsequent sessions by sorting out some materials. Therefore, participants were encouraged to
view their efforts as genuinely productive.
In the earned treatment, the initial endowments in the four-player dictator game (4PDG) were
determined by the participants’ within session rank in the real-effort task. Rank depended on
the number of small pots either filled or emptied.
1.2 The Four-Player Dictator Game
The four-player dictator game (4PDG) was conducted using specially designed and
manufactured trays. Each participant received a tray which was divided into four quadrants,
each quadrant relating to a participant. The participant’s own quadrant was blue and located at
the side of the tray closest to the participant when the tray was placed on the desk in front of
him/her. Each quadrant contained black counters which represented the initial endowment of
the corresponding participant. One black counter was worth €1. The participants were told they
3could rearrange the counters any way they liked, as long as none of the counters were removed
from the tray. All instructions were given verbally in Spanish.
1.3 Show-up fee
In addition to their final payoffs from the 4PDG, each participant received a show-up fee of
€4. In the random treatment, the €4 was presented as a flat fee for the real-effort task. In the
earned treatment, the €4 was added to each of the possible earnings levels and then set aside to
be collected at the end of the session. Therefore, the €4 represented a minimum total final
payoff for each participant.
2. Participant Sample
We ran 13 experimental sessions in Bilbao (northern Spain), seven sessions of 16 participants
and six sessions of 12, with a total of 184 participants. In Cordoba (southern Spain), we ran 16
experimental sessions, nine sessions of 16 participants and the rest of 12, with a total of 228
participants. The large majority of the sample (95%) was aged 20–35.
Table A.1 displays the main characteristics of our sample, which is evenly distributed across
genders and cities. Out of 412 participants, eight people left the ideology question unanswered
– less than 2% of the sample. LERI is slightly skewed to the left, with a mean value of four
(see Figure A.1).
Table A.1: Participants and treatment assignment
All Unemployed Employed Students
Sample sizes 412 137 161 114
Characteristics
Female (%) 53.3% 51.2% 57.1% 50%
Age (mean) 26.9 28.8 28.3 22.7
Years in education 17.9 18.1 18.8 16.5
Left-right (mean) 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.3
Location
Bilbao (%) 44.7% 37.2% 47.8% 49.1%
Cordoba (%) 55.3% 62.8% 52.2% 50.9%
Treatments
Random (%) 40.8% 45.3% 37.3% 40.3%
Earned (%) 59.2% 54.7% 62.7% 59.7%
4Figure A.1: Distribution of Left-right
3. Regression models and their interpretation
When estimating Model (1) the analytical objective is to establish whether, how, and to what
extent the allocation made by t݅o ݆in the DJ game is conditioned upon ’݆s initial endowment
and whether, how, and to what extent this conditioning varies depending on ’݅s employment
status and political ideology.
5Model (1) took the following form:
ݔ௜௝ஷ௜=ܽ ଴ +ܽ ଵܧ௜+ ଶܽݕ௝+ ଷܽ൫ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ସܷܽ௜+ ହܽ(ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜) + ଺ܽ൫ܷ ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ଻ܽ൫ܷ ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ଼ܽܮܧܴܫ௜+ ଽܽ(ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜) + ଵܽ଴൫ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ଵܽଵ൫ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ߝ௜௝
where:
- ݔ௜௝ஷ௜∗ is the allocation made by ݅to ݆ in the 4PDG expressed as a proportion of the
maximum amount that ݅could allocate to ݆(€44);
- ܧ௜= 1 if p݅layed the DJ game under the earned treatment, = 0 if p݅layed the DJ game
under the random treatment;
- ݕ௝ is ’݆s initial endowment in the 4PDG also expressed as a proportion of €44;
- ܷ௜takes the value 1 if player i݅s unemployed and zero if they are employed or a student;
- ܮܧܴܫ௜ captures ’݅s political ideology and ranges from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme
right);
- ଴ܽ to ଵܽଵ are the coefficients to be estimated; and
- ߝ௜௝ is the error term.
Moderate variations in partial selfishness manifest as a vertical shifts in the relationship
between݆’s initial endowment and݅’s allocation to݆; an increase (decrease) in݅’s selfishness
leads to a downward (upward) shift in the relationship. Differences in moderate partial
selfishness between left leaning and right leaning participants, between the employed and
students on the one hand and unemployed on the other, and between treatments are accounted
for by including ܧ௜, ܷ௜and ܮܧܴܫ௜, and two-way interactions between the three as regressors in
the model.
6Assuming linearity (see section 4 for tests), the extent to which the allocation by ݅to ݆ is
conditioned upon݆’s initial endowment equals the effect of a one unit change in݆’s initial
endowment on ’݅s allocation to݆, i.e., it is the slope of the relationship between the two.
Effect of a one unit change in࢐’s initial endowment on ࢏’s allocation to ࢐, ∆௫೔ೕ
∆௬ೕ
:
- for an ݅who is employed or a student under the Random treatment = ଶܽ + ଵܽ଴ܮܧܴܫ௜;
- for an ݅who is employed or a student under the Earned treatment
= ଶܽ + ଷܽ + ଵܽ଴ܮܧܴܫ௜+ ଵܽଵܮܧܴܫ௜;
- for an ݅who is unemployed under the Random treatment = ଶܽ + ଺ܽ + ଵܽ଴ܮܧܴܫ௜;
- for an ݅who is unemployed under the Earned treatment
= ଶܽ + ଷܽ + ଺ܽ + ଻ܽ + ଵܽ଴ܮܧܴܫ௜+ ଵܽଵܮܧܴܫ௜.
The slopes graphed in Fig. 1, for the three sub-samples of participants are derived from
estimations of the following simplified version of the model:
ݔ௜௝ஷ௜=ܾ ଴ + ܾ ଵܧ௜+ ଶܾݕ௝+ ଷܾ൫ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ସܾܮܧܴܫ௜+ ହܾ(ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜) + ଺ܾ൫ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ଻ܾ൫ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝൯+ ߤ௜௝
Effect of a one unit change in࢐’s initial endowment on ࢏’s allocation to ࢐, ∆௫೔ೕ
∆௬ೕ
:
- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 1 (extreme left) under the Random treatment = ଶܾ + ଺ܾ;
- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 2 under the Random treatment = ଶܾ + 2 ଺ܾ;
- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 3 under the Random treatment = ଶܾ + 3 ଺ܾ; etc. to
- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 10 (extreme right) under the Random treatment = ଶܾ + 10 ଺ܾ;
- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 1 (extreme left) under the Earned treatment = ଶܾ + ଷܾ + ଺ܾ + ଻ܾ;
- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 2 under the Earned treatment = ଶܾ + ଷܾ + 2( ଺ܾ + ଻ܾ);
- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 3 under the Earned treatment = ଶܾ + ଷܾ + 3( ଺ܾ + ଻ܾ); etc. to
7- for an ݅with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 10 (extreme right) under the Earned treatment
= ଶܾ + ଷܾ + 10( ଺ܾ + ଻ܾ).
The extent to which participants with any given ܮܧܴܫ௜acknowledge earned entitlement can be
defined as the difference in slope between the earned and random treatment for such
participants. So, for example, the extent to a participant with ܮܧܴܫ௜= 6 acknowledge earned
entitlement is given by ଷܾ + 6 ଻ܾ.
When estimating the models we exclude allocations to others by participants who took all the
counters for themselves. We do this because such participants are signaling nothing about their
notion of distributive justice, they are simply aiming to maximize their own personal payoff.
4. Linear restriction tests
The models presented above and the estimations presented in Table 1 (column 1) assume that,
conditional on experimental treatment, the decision-maker i’s placement on the left-right scale,
ܮܧܴܫ௜, and participant i’s employment status, the relationship between participant j’s initial
endowment and i’s final allocation to j is linear. They also assume linearity in the relationship
between ܮܧܴܫ௜, and participant i’s final allocation to j, this time, conditional on treatment,
employment status and j’s initial endowment.
To test the first assumption, we estimated an unrestricted version of Model (1) and conducted
a linear restriction test corresponding to the null hypothesis that the conditional relationships
are linear in j’s initial endowment and the alternative hypothesis that they are not linear. In the
unrestricted model, j’s initial endowment is included as a set of dummy variables, instead of as
a single continuous variable, one corresponding to each of the possible values that j’s initial
endowment could take. Then, each of these is interacted with ܧ௜, ܮܧܴܫ௜, ܧ௜∗ ܮܧܴܫ௜, ܷ௜and
8ܧ௜∗ ܷ௜. An F-test indicates that the fit of the unrestricted model is no better than the fit of the
linear model (p-value=0.204).
We were unable to test the second assumption using the same method owing to small cell
frequencies in ܮܧܴܫ௜. Instead, we estimated an unrestricted model, which included the square
of ܮܧܴܫ௜ as well as its interactions with ܧ௜, ݕ௝ and ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝. Once again, the F-test shows that
the fit of the unrestricted model is no better than the fit of the linear model (p-value=0.412).
5. Accounting for potentially considerable differences in partial selfishness
To investigate whether there is an association between ܮܧܴܫ௜ and selfishness we estimate a
version of Model 1 focusing on each participant i’s allocation to himself/herself. We also
estimate a linear probability model with dependent variable ݁ݏ ݈݂ ݅ݏℎ௜=1 for respondents who
allocated everything to themselves, 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.2 display the
results. Neither ܮܧܴܫ௜nor ܷ௜nor any of the interactions involving ܮܧܴܫ௜or ܷ௜bear significant
coefficients, the four ܮܧܴܫ௜-related variables are jointly insignificant (p-value=0.248, 0.175),
and the four ܷ௜-related variables are jointly insignificant (p-value=0.651, 0.978). These results
indicate that political and ideology and employment status have no bearing on individual
selfishness and that our findings relating to the slopes of the relationship between what one
participant allocates to another and whether and how much that other participant earned in the
real effort task are not driven by systematic differences in selfishness across sub-samples.
9Notes: Sample includes allocations made to self; standard errors clustered
at the individual level; j's initial endowment (yj) = j’s initial endowment
expressed as a proportion of the 44 tokens in the game; Earned (E)=1 if i
made allocations under the earned treatment, =0 if i made allocations
under the random treatment * -sig. at 10%; ** -sig.at 5%; *** -sig. at 1%.
6. Accounting for clustering non-parametrically and at different levels
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our inferences to a change in the method we use to
account for clustering at the individual level and to accounting for clustering at the session
level. The standard errors presented in Table 1 of the paper are adjusted to account for
clustering at the individual level using the standard parametric approach. Here, instead, we us
Table A.2: Regression analysis of selfishness.







Earned treatment (ܧ௜) -0.118 -0.060
(0.232) (0.246)
i's initial endowment (ݕ௜) -0.386 -0.149
(0.586) (0.662)




ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜ -0.020 0.004
(0.050) (0.056)
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ݕ௜ 0.000 0.016
(0.130) (0.139)




ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜ 0.114 0.088
(0.171) (0.185)
ܷ௜∗ ݕ௜ 0.458 0.071
(0.470) (0.501)
ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௜ -0.562 -0.352
(0.643) (0.688)





a wild bootstrap. This method can be applied when the number of clusters is small. So, we can
use this method to account for clustering, not only at the individual level, but also at the session
level. Treatment assignment was conducted at the session level. So, accounting for clustering
at the session level is expected to reduce the power of tests relating to the treatment identifier,
ܧ௜, and all interactions involving ܧ௜.
Table A.3 presents the estimated coefficients of the models in Table 1, along with the wild
bootstrapped p-values clustered at the individual level (p-values in curved brackets) and wild
bootstrapped p-values clustered at the session level (p-values in square brackets). The statistical
inferences we made based on Table 1 remain unchanged when we shift to clustering at the
individual level using a wild bootstrap. When we cluster at the session level, among students,
the association between political ideology and AEE is significant only at the 10% level.
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Table A.3: Re-estimation of the effect of ideology and employment status on distributive
preferences accounting for clustering non-parametrically and at different levels
Dependent variable = i’s allocation to j
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Employed Unemployed Students
Earned treatment (ܧ௜) -0.075 ** -0.131 ** 0.038 -0.039
(0.020) (0.014) (0.382) (0.482)
[0.036] [0.014] [0.412] [0.508]
j's initial endowment (ݕ௝) -0.073 -0.089 0.073 -0.052
(0.530) (0.784) (0.560) (0.582)
[0.458] [0.692] [0.522] [0.570]
ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.218 * 0.414 * -0.087 -0.039
(0.086) (0.060) (0.594) (0.790)
[0.056] [0.028] [0.552] [0.860]
ܮܧܴܫ௜ -0.004 -0.012 0.004 -0.003
(0.402) (0.122) (0.654) (0.556)
[0.424] [0.210] [0.654] [0.770]
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜ -0.005 0.007 -0.017 -0.011
(0.466) (0.572) (0.164) (0.432)
[0.510] [0.562] [0.186] [0.468]
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.006
(0.834) (0.886) (0.946) (0.716)
[0.748] [0.842] [0.942] [0.732]
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.035 -0.003 0.051 0.078 *#
(0.202) (0.950) (0.214) (0.048)




ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜ 0.069 ***
(0.010)
[0.008]
ܷ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.127 **
(0.010)
[0.028]
ܷ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ -0.236 **#
(0.008)
[0.014]
Constant 0.231 *** 0.257 *** 0.176 *** 0.231 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.000]
Observations 1092 432 363 297
Participants 364 144 121 99
Notes: Sample includes final allocations made to others by participants who made at least one positive final
allocation to another; there are three observations per participant; j's initial endowment (yj) = j's initial endowment
expressed as a proportion of the 44 tokens in the game; Earned (E_i)=1 if i made allocations under the earned
treatment, =0 if i made allocations under the random treatment; p-values reported in curved brackets are calculated
using a wild bootstrap to account for clustering at the individual level; p-values reported in square brackets are
calculated using a wild bootstrap to account for clustering at the session level (29 sessions); *** - sig. at 1%
regardless of clustering level; ** - sig. at 5% regardless of clustering level, * - sig. at 10% regardless of clustering
level, **# - sig. at 1% when clustering at the individual level and at 5% when clustering at the session level, *# -
sig. at 5% when clustering at the individual level and at
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7. Inclusion of city of residence, age, gender, and education as controls
In table A.4 we re-estimate our model for the student sub-sample, while including controls for
age, city of residence, gender and education and their interactions with ݕ௝,ܧ௜ and ݕ௝ ∗ ܧ௜. We
introduce one control variable and its interactions at a time to minimize the problem of
multicollinearity.
Each column of the table presents the results relating to a control variable that is named in the
column header. Two of the control variables, age and city of residence, affect allocations to
others. However, only one of the control variables significantly affects acknowledgement of
earned entitlement; students in Bilbao acknowledge earned entitlement significantly less than
students in Cordoba. Most importantly, the coefficient on ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝, which is the
estimator of the effect of ideology on the acknowledgement of earned entitlement, remains
positive and significant across all the models, indicating that our main finding is robust to the
inclusion of controls.
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Table A.3: Re-estimation of the effect of ideology and student status on distributive
preferences
Dependent variable = i’s allocation to j
Control variable = - Age(years) Bilbao Female
Education
(years)
Earned treatment (ܧ௜) -0.039 -0.066 -0.053 -0.057 -0.062
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.059) (0.049)
j's initial endowment (ݕ௝) -0.052 -0.166 -0.145 0.010 -0.080
(0.080) (0.120) (0.097) (0.069) (0.087)
ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ -0.039 0.108 0.131 -0.068 0.034
(0.170) (0.189) (0.168) (0.179) (0.158)
ܮܧܴܫ௜ -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0 .005)
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜ -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.009
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
ܮܧܴܫ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.078 ** 0.073 * 0.074 ** 0.068 * 0.073 *
(0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ௜ 0.011 ** -0.060 ** 0.020 0.007
(0.005) (0.026) (0.029) (0.006)
ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ௜∗ ܧ௜ -0.004 0.038 0.002 -0.010
(0.006) (0.042) (0.044) (0.010)
ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ௜∗ ݕ௝ -0.027 0.164 ** -0.110 -0.009
(0.017) (0.075) (0.083) (0.020)
ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ௜∗ ܧ௜∗ ݕ௝ 0.025 -0.321 ** 0.137 0.031
(0.023) (0.135) (0.147) (0.031)
Constant 0.231 *** 0.276 *** 0.262 *** 0.219 *** 0.248 ***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.035) (0.028)
Joint sig. of Control and
interactions 0.0012 0.0002 0.3058 0.4176
Observations 297 297 297 297 297
Participants 99 99 99 99 99
Notes: Sample includes allocations made to others; there are three observations per participant; j's initial
endowment (yj) = j's initial endowment expressed as a proportion of the 44 tokens in the game; Earned (E)=1
if i made allocations under the earned treatment, =0 if i made allocations under the random treatment; standard
errors clustered at the individual level; *** - sig. at 1%; ** - sig. at 5%, * - sig. at 10%
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8. Instructions and post-experimental questionnaire
Experimental scripts
Script DJ Experiments





[Before entering the lab subjects need to select a participant letter at random and be asked to
sit at the desk bearing their participant letter. Record participant letters on the session form.
Once everyone is seated…]
Thank you for coming here today and for agreeing to take part in this workshop.
When you came in today, you each chose a letter.
This is your player identification letter.
Please keep this player identification letter with you. You will need it at the end of the session
to claim your money.
Does everyone understand?
We are now ready to begin so please could you all listen carefully to the instructions.
While the workshop is going on, please do not talk to anyone other than me and my assistants.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk and
answer your question. If you talk to the people around you, you will be asked to leave.
There are three parts to the workshop. I am now going to explain what we want you to do in
the first part, but please do not start the task until you are told to do so.
You are going to spend 7 minutes helping us sort out some materials that are to be used in
another workshop later today, or tomorrow.
We are not asking you to do this for free, of course. You will be paid for helping us in this way.
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On your desk, you will find a box of gravel and some small plastic pots. [Hold up example pot]
<On your desk, you will find some small plastic pots containing blue and yellow gravel, like
this one, and two larger containers. [Hold up example pot]>
Please put 7 pieces of blue gravel and 7 pieces of yellow gravel in each pot.<Please empty the
small pots, one or two at a time, and put the blue gravel in one of the larger containers and the
yellow gravel in the other.>
Please be careful when counting the gravel. There should be 14 pieces of gravel in total in each
pot, 7 blue and 7 yellow…like this one [show example].<Please be gentle with the small pots
so you do not break the hinges on the lids.>
{Only for the filling treatments} Once you have filled a pot, make sure that the pot lid is closed
properly.
We will check the pots that you fill<We will check and count the pots that you have emptied>.
{Only for the earned treatments}The more pots you fill <empty>, the more money you will
have at the end of this task. You will use this money in the second part of this workshop.
{Only for the earned treatments} However, any pots that do not have 7 pieces of blue gravel
and 7 pieces of yellow gravel will not be counted. <However, any pots that have been emptied
but the gravel has not been sorted into the larger containers, will not be counted.>
{Only for the earned treatments}The people who fill <empty> the most pots will start the
second part of the workshop with more money than the people who fill <empty> the fewest.
If you run out of pots or gravel please raise your hand and we will bring you more. <If you run
out of pots please raise your hand and one of us will bring you more.>
Does anyone have any questions?
[Wait… answer as required]
Please start filling <emptying> pots now. I will tell you when the 7 (seven) minutes are up.
[Note start time]
[After 7 minutes…] Please can everyone stop now. Please raise both hands in the air and keep
them there until one of my assistants comes to you. Thank you for your work. We will now
collect the trays, pots and gravel.
We will check that each pot has 7 pieces of blue gravel and 7 pieces of yellow gravel, write
down the number of pots each one of you has filled and then begin the next part of the
workshop. <We are going to count the number of pots that you have emptied, we will check
that the gravel has been sorted correctly and then begin the next part of the workshop.> This
will take a few minutes. Please be patient and do not talk. I will explain the next part of the
workshop once we are ready.
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{Only for the earned treatments} [Rank the subjects according to how many small pots they
filled. Disregard pots that do not contain 7+7. Record the number of pots and their rank on
the session form. Then, allocate trays to subjects according to Table 1 (which links ranks to
tray numbers) at the end of this document. Record their tray numbers on the session form. Also
write the participant/desk letters on the tray lids and the corresponding receipts.] < [Rank the
subjects according to how many small pots they emptied. Disregard pots from which the gravel
has been left unsorted. Record the number of sorted pots and their rank on the session form.
Then, allocate trays to subjects according to Table 1 (which links ranks to tray numbers) at the
end of this document. Record their tray numbers on the session form. Also write the
participant/desk letters on the tray lids and the corresponding receipts.] >
{Only for the random treatments} {[Count up and record the number of pots filled,
disregarding any pots that do not contain 7+7. Then, allocate each subject a tray by pulling
participant letters out of one cup and tray numbers out of another. Record the participant-tray
number matches on the session form. Also write the participant/desk letters on the tray lids and
the corresponding receipts. While this is going on, the experimenter should read on]}. |[Count
up and record the number of pots sorted, disregarding any pots from which the gravel has been
left unsorted. Then, allocate each subject a tray by pulling participant letters out of one cup
and tray numbers out of another. Record the participant letter/tray number matches on the
session form. Also write the participant/desk letters on the tray lids and the corresponding
receipts. While this is going on, the experimenter should read on].|
Alright, we are nearly ready to continue with the workshop. Thank you once again for the effort
you put into filling <emptying> the pots.
As promised, you will be paid for this. {Only for the random treatment, filling and emptying}
{4 Euros has been set aside for each of you. You will receive this at the end of the workshop.}
{Only for the earned treatments} There are two parts to your pay:
{Only for the earned treatments} First, 4 Euros has been set aside for each of you. You will
receive this at the end of the workshop.
{Only for the earned treatments} Second, each of you has earned additional money for the next
part of the workshop depending on how many pots you filled <emptied>. You will have earned
anywhere between an extra 6 Euros and 16 Euros.
Now I am going to explain the second stage of the workshop.
Please listen carefully as these instructions are very important. Once again, please do not start
the task until you are told to do so.
In this part of the workshop you are all going to be placed in groups of 4. However, you will
never know who else is in your group.
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{Only for the random treatments} {You are each going to start off with a certain amount of
money. My assistant has pulled participant letters out of a cup, at random, to find out how much
money each of you is going to start off with.}
[Hold up tray photo] In a few minutes we are going to hand each of you a tray. You will find
a copy of this photo to your right.
Each tray has 4 triangles: one triangle for each person in your group. The blue triangle is your
triangle. The 3 cream triangles are for the other people in your group.
[Hold up counter] On each tray there will be several counters, like this one, in each triangle.
In the photo, the little black round things to the right of the tray are counters.
{Only for the earned treatments} Each of you has earned a different amount of counters based
on the number of pots you filled <emptied> in the first part of the workshop.
Each counter is worth 1 Euro, so 6 counters in a triangle is worth 6 Euros, 3 counters is worth
3 Euros, 10 counters is worth 10 Euros, and so on.
The counters that are in the blue triangle show the amount of money that each of you are starting
the second part of the workshop with.
The counters in the three cream triangles show the amount of money that the other people in
your group are starting the second part of the workshop with.
{Only for the earned treatments} You will never know who else is in your group, you will just
know how much money they earned by looking at the number of counters in their triangles.
{Only for the random treatments} {You will never know who else is in your group, you will
just know how much money they are starting out with.}
At the end of the workshop, these counters will be changed for real money.
We are going to hand the trays out now so you can see how much money you and the other
people in your group have at the start of this part of the workshop. Each tray is covered by a
lid (please only lift the lid when the tray is on your desk so that it cannot be seen by anyone
else. It is important that no one sees the contents of your tray).
[Hand out the trays being careful to hand the right tray to the right participant. Meanwhile
say…]
There are a total of 44 counters on each tray. Please do not take any counters away with you.
It is very important that we get all the counters back. Please have a look at the tray so you know
how much money you have and everyone else in your group has at this point in this workshop.
{Only for the earned treatments} Remember as you look at the tray, the person with the most
counters in the group has the most money because they filled <emptied> the most pots. The
person with the fewest counters has the least money because they did not fill <empty>as many
pots as others.
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{Only for the random treatments} {Remember as you look at the tray, the person with the most
counters in the group has the most money, and the person with the fewest counters has the least
money at this point in the workshop.}
Everyone should now have a tray and should know how much money they and the other people
in their group have for the second part of the workshop.
If anyone does not understand their tray, or has any other questions please raise your hand.
OK. In this stage, if you choose, you can change the amounts of money that you and the other
members of your group are to take home at the end of the workshop by moving the counters
from one triangle to another.
In other words, you can take as many counters away from some people, including yourself, and
give those counters to other people, including yourself.
If you want, you can move the counters between the triangles any way you choose until you
are happy with the number of counters in each triangle. However, you are not allowed to take
any counters completely off the tray. There are 44 counters on the trays and all 44 counters
need to be on the trays when they are returned to us.
Let me repeat this as it is important. If you want, you can move the counters between the
triangles any way you choose until you are happy with the number of counters in each triangle.
However, you are not allowed to take any counters completely off the tray. There are 44
counters on the trays and all 44 counters need to be on the trays when they are returned to us.
Before you start moving the counters on your tray, I have to mention something important.
Once everyone has decided how to move the counters we will collect the trays. Then, for each
group of four, we will put the four tray numbers into a cup and pick one at random. This will
be done for each of the groups. The money you receive at the end of the workshop –on top of
the 4 Euros already put aside—will depend on the decision made by the person in your group
whose number is picked. Every person’s tray has an equal chance of being picked, so every
person’s decision has an equal chance of being carried out. It is important that you think about
your decision very carefully.
Finally, the decision you make will be kept secret. No one will ever know whether you were in
their group or whether you moved money to them or away from them.
In summary:
1. The blue triangle is your triangle.
2. The other triangles relate to 3 other people but you don’t know who they are.
3. The counters are equivalent to money.
4. The number of counters in a triangle tells you how much that person earned.
5. You can move the counters on your tray any way you choose.
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6. If and how you move them will never be known by anyone else.
7. At time of payment, only one person’s decision about final payments will be
carried out. This decision will be randomly picked out of a cup which has all four
tray numbers that correspond to all four people in the group.
If you do not understand what you are being asked to do or how it might affect yourself and
others, or if you have any other questions, please raise your hand and we will help you.
You may now make your decisions about whether and where to move counters. You can have
as much time as you want. When you have arranged the counters as you see fit please close the
lid of your tray and put up your hand so that one of us can collect your tray from you.
[When all trays collected…] We are going to hand out questionnaires that we would like you
to fill out. This questionnaire is the third part of the workshop. When this part of the workshop
is finished you will be paid and will be free to leave. Please note that the questionnaire is on
both sides of the pages. When you have finished filling out the questionnaire please raise your
hand.
[Hand out and later collect questionnaires once they finish. Calculate pay with reference to
notes in the next section of this document. Draw up receipts.]
We are now finished. Thank you for being so patient and thank you for participating in this
workshop. We have worked out how much money each of you is to be paid. In a minute I will
ask you to come, one by one, to the desk in the waiting room so we can give you your money
and you can sign a receipt. Once you sign the receipt, you will be free to leave.
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Experimental Questionnaire
Letter ID for the session: _________Personal ID Code:_______________
Date: (dd/mm/yy)_____________________ Time of Session: ______________________
Research on Individual Decision-Making
Thank you for participating in this research. Please take a few moments to fill out the
questionnaire below. All your answers will be kept confidential. There are no right or wrong
answers, so please answer honestly.
0. Did you participate in this study last year?
1. Yes 2. No
If you answered YES, proceed to question 01. If you answered NO, proceed to question 02.
01.





















B) Before participating in this study, had you heard of it?
1. Yes 2. No
C) If yes, could you please tell us if that information influenced your decision in






1. Date of Birth: (DD/MM/YYYY) _____________
2. Age: ______________________
3. Sex 1. Male 2. Female
4. Nationality: _______________________
5. Postal Code: _______________________
6. Highest level of education completed
1. = No schooling
2. = EGB/Primary
3. = Secondary/ESO
4. = A Levels/BUP
5. = Middle Grade Vocational Studies
6. = Superior Grade Vocational Studies
7. = Special Regime Education (Visual arts and Design, Curator/Restorer,
Music, Dance, Dramatic Arts
(Theatre), Languages, Military Service)
8. = Diploma/Certificate at University
22
9. = Bachelor’s degree (under the old system)
10. = Second Cycle Studies




15. = Other (specify)
_______________________________________________________________




How long have you been unemployed (number of months: ____)?
4. Retired
5. On maternity leave
6. Housewife/Looking after family
7. Studying part-time
8. Studying full-time
9. On sick leave or disabled
10. Other
(specify_______________________________________________)
8. Have you been unemployed in the last year, i.e., since April 2013?
1. Yes 2. No
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9. If yes, how many months in total have you been unemployed in the last year?
__________________________________
Please also indicate the date
From _______________ Until ____________________
From _______________ Until ____________________
From _______________ Until ____________________
From _______________ Until ____________________
From _______________ Until ____________________
From _______________ Until ____________________
10. Do you currently do any work for which you earn money, i.e., do you have a job or
a business?
1. Yes 2. No
11. If yes, how much do you earn a month? (net income)
_____________________________€
12. Is this work full-time or part-time?
1. Full-time 2. Part-time
3. Other (specify)___________________________________________________
4. Not Applicable (if you are not working)
13. If yes, how many hours do you work per week? __________________
14. How did you find your current job?
1. Through a family member 2. Through a friend 3. Through an
employment office
4. On my own 5. Other (specify) ______________________________
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15. If you are currently working for money, when was the last time you were either a
full-time student or unemployed?
Last time a full time student (mm/yyyy): _______________________
Last time unemployed (mm/yyyy): __________________________
16. If you are NOT currently working for money, do you have any other form of
income?
(you may tick more than one box)
1. Pension




6. Support from family members (grandfathers, fathers)
7. Other______________________________________________________
17. If you are NOT currently working for money and NOT studying full time, when
was the last time you were either a full-time student or in full time paid
employment?
Last time a full time student (mm/yyyy): _______________________________
Last time in full time paid employment (mm/yyyy): ______________________
18. If you are NOT currently working for money and NOT studying full-time, are
you receiving or have you recently received (in the last 6 months) any training
designed to help you gain employment?
1. Yes 2. No





20. If you are a full-time student, please write the name of the degree you are
studying for, e.g., Business or Vocational Studies (What specialty?).
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
21. If you are a full-time student, when was the last time you were either in full-time
paid employment or unemployed and claiming benefits or some type of grant?
Last time in full time paid employment (mm/yyyy):_____________________
Last time unemployed and claiming benefits or a grant (mm/yyyy):_________
22. How many people, including you, live in your household? (here, you should include
all those people who sleep in the same household as you on a regular basis)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
23. Would you describe your family as:
1. Rich 2. Upper income 3. Middle income 4. Lower income 5. Poor
24. Which of the following people or organizations do you think has the greatest
responsibility to help the poor? (choose one answer only)
1. The Church 2. Charities or non-profit organizations 3. The government
4. Families and relatives of the poor 5. The poor themselves
25. When people talk about politics, the terms left and right are usually used. Below




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
26. Finally, look around the room and tell us how many of the other people in the
workshop do you know well or think of as friends _________________
